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“[W]e live in a time when school violence is an 
unfortunate reality that educators must confront on an 
all too frequent basis. The recent spate of school 
shootings have put our nation on edge and have 
focused attention on what school officials, law 
enforcement and others can do or could have done to 
prevent these kinds of tragedies.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ocial networking through sites like Facebook and MySpace has 
revolutionized how adults and students connect with others in their 
community, and allow students to connect with others in their school 
as well as students at other schools. Additionally, these sites allow 
users to post comments on other people’s sites about their photos and 
on their “walls,” send messages to each other, and invite people to 
social events. Not surprisingly, students occasionally exchange less 
savory comments, like threats, over these sites—comments that could 
raise concerns about student and campus safety. 
The focus of this note is what schools can, and should be able to 
do, through discipline or other action, when threatening speech or 
activity appears on a student’s social network profile or between 
students on such a network. There are obvious constitutional issues 
with giving a public school such abilities, as monitoring or acting on 
students’ speech could infringe their First Amendment rights and 
punishing them for that speech could pose a due process issue. 
Fortunately, for school administrators, the Supreme Court has made 
due process an easy hurdle for schools to clear in Goss v. Lopez, which 
upheld school suspensions as a “necessary tool to maintain order.”2 
The Court added that the school must (1) give students written or oral 
notification of the charges against them and (2) explain the evidence 
backing the charges, as well as (3) give them the ability to provide an 
explanation for their actions.3 While this case has been distinguished 
many times, it has also been cited positively over the past thirty-five 
years, and sets a clear standard that enables schools to comply with 
due process requirements.4 As a result, I will not focus on due process 
                                                          
1 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). 
2 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). 
3 Id. at 574, 581. 
4 See A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 548 F. Supp. 2d 219, 223 
(E.D. Va. 2008). 
S
2012 Social Networking and Student Safety 211 
issues that may arise in disciplining students for their threatening 
speech online. 
On the other hand, schools lack legal guidance on how to properly 
asses a student’s threatening online speech as current legislation and 
case law does not provide a determinative approach to investigating or 
punishing such speech.5 When it comes to students, their safety and 
the overall security of the campus should trump any free speech 
concerns, and many lower courts have recently taken that stance in a 
number of cases involving threatening student speech on social 
networks, both in secondary schools and universities.6 These cases 
illustrate that courts have the tools to determine if a school’s 
disciplinary action was constitutional under the First Amendment, and 
often uphold the school’s action if it was reasonable under the 
circumstances to protect the school and students.7 However, despite 
these cases, schools nationwide still lack definitive guidance to create 
a procedure that would allow its officials to take decisive action on 
threatening speech and avoid any violation of a student’s right to free 
speech. 
This note will argue that schools should have the ability to act 
liberally when a student’s speech on a social network presents a threat 
to school or student safety, and that the school should be able to 
intervene to prevent harm and discipline the student, if necessary. The 
type of activity that schools could act on would include threats against 
a student or teacher and other indications of violent action, even if it 
were to the student himself. This note will focus on what public 
primary and secondary schools (i.e., kindergarten through high school) 
could do in such circumstances, and will lay out a model procedure to 
deal with these situations in those school settings. 
The discussion will proceed in five parts. Part II discusses student 
use of social networking, generally. Part III will then discuss the four 
Supreme Court cases on student speech, which provides a foundation 
for determining when and how a school may discipline student speech. 
Part IV discusses threatening student speech, the true threat doctrine as 
                                                          
5 Christi Cassel, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from 
Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 650–51 
(2007). 
6 See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 
2011); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. 
494 F.3d. 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 814–
15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
7 D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 764–65; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d. at 39–40; Tatro, 800 
N.W.2d at 814–15. 
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established by the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States,8 as well as 
cases that have dealt with threatening student speech. Part IV offers a 
model procedure on how schools can act on a student’s social 
networking activity that poses a threat to students and campus. Finally, 
Part V provides the note’s conclusion that student speech online 
should be protected unless it presents a threat of serious disruption or 
violence at school, in which case schools should have the ability to 
take swift action to prevent any harm from befalling the school, 
students, or educators. 
II. STUDENTS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING 
Teens and young adults, especially those in school, have led the 
way in the growing use of online social networking, and as social 
networking sites have evolved and the number of users has grown, 
concerns about student safety and privacy in their use, have 
correspondingly increased. Recent statistics show that the internet and 
social networking are a part of a vast majority of all students’ daily 
lives. According to a recent Pew Research Center project, 
approximately 93% of teens ages 12–17 go online, and 73% of those 
users are on social networking sites.9 Additionally, of adults ages 18–
33, which would encompass the average college student, 95% go 
online and 83% of them use social networking sites.10 This near 
ubiquitous use of the internet and increasing use of social networking 
sites by teens11 and adults12 inevitably leads to questions about internet 
and social network use and their impact on educational institutions. 
The major sites that students use today are MySpace and 
Facebook.13 MySpace, founded in 2003, was an immediate success, 
and now provides anyone with an email address above the age of 
                                                          
8 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
9 Kathryn Zickuhr, Generations 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 9 
(Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Generations-
2010.aspx. 
10 Id. 
11 Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and 
Young Adults, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Feb. 3, 2010) available 
at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx (the 
2006 PEW study explains that 55% of teens used social networking sites, but in 
2009, it was up to 73%). 
12 Id. at 17 (adults as a whole, aged 18+, have increased their usage of social 
networking sites from 8% in 2005 to 42% in Sept. of 2009, with adults 18–33 
constituting the majority of those users). 
13 Id. at 18. 
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thirteen, access to an online global network.14 MySpace is a social 
networking site dedicated to connecting not only people to people, but 
also people to the media and entertainment that they enjoy—hosting 
band websites with streaming music, pictures, movies, and other 
media.15 
Facebook was founded a year later, and has a similar goal to 
MySpace, but is more focused on connecting people to people, with its 
stated mission of “giving people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected.”16 In 2008, Facebook overtook 
MySpace as the most popular social networking site,17 but both sites 
have millions of users; as of January 2011, Facebook boasts over 600 
million users18 with MySpace’s numbers dropping, as a result of users 
switching to Facebook, from over 100 million to 63 million between 
January and February 2011, alone.19 
With these impressive numbers and access to both sites available 
not only via computer, but also through mobile devices, it is clear that 
students nearly always have access to their social networks. This 
means that even if a school blocks the sites on its networks, it may be 
possible for the students to access the sites in other ways, and they 
therefore could send and access messages, threatening or otherwise, 
both during school and afterward. With the recent increase of startling 
incidents of cyber-bullying and resulting violence to students20 and 
teachers,21 awareness of these problems, especially those on social 
                                                          
14
 MYSPACE.COM, Myspace Safety, http://www.myspace.com/help/safety/parents 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
15 See MYSPACE.COM, About Us, http://www.myspace.com/help/AboutUs (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
16 See FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
17 Geoffrey Mack, Facebook Overtakes MySpace, ALEXA BLOG (May 7, 2008, 
3:52 PM), http://blog.alexa.com/2008/05/facebook-overtakes-myspace_07.html. 
18 Nicolas Carlson, Facebook Has More Than 600 Million Users, Goldman Tells 
Clients, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2011, 1:45 PM), http: //www.businessinsider.com
/facebook-has-more-than-600-million-users-goldman-tells-clients-2011-1. 
19 Desire Athow, 10 Million Users Leave MySpace Within a Month, 
ITPORTAL.COM (Mar. 27, 2011), http: //www.itproportal.com/2011/03/27/10-million-
users-leave-myspace-within-month/. 
20
 DEPT. OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, 42–44 
(2010), http://www.edpubs.gov/document/ed005161p.pdf?ck=662 (noting that this 
study reports that from the most recent data in 2007, 32% of students of students 
aged 12–18 were victims of cyber-bullying of various degrees). 
21 See generally Ruth Broster & Ken Brien, Cyber-Bullying of Educators by 
Students: Evolving Legal and Policy Developments, 20 EDUC. & L.J. 35 (2010) 
(discussing the nature and scope of cyber-bulling in schools against teachers by 
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networking sites, has made it apparent that there is a growing need for 
educators to have guidelines to enable them to act quickly and 
decisively to prevent any harm to the school or students. 
So far, schools’ attempts to discipline students for online, off-
campus speech have met with mixed results, with courts sometimes 
upholding the school’s actions, and other times finding them 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.22 Schools and courts 
alike need a reasoned and definitive approach to deal with this issue, 
and in the public school system this will require a balance between, on 
the one hand, constitutional issues of free speech and due process and, 
on the other, school concerns about safety. 
III. SOCIAL NETWORKING AND STUDENTS’ FREE SPEECH 
In cases involving threatening online student speech, lower courts, 
lacking guidance from the Supreme Court, have followed two lines of 
reasoning to decide whether the school’s disciplinary act was 
appropriate. The first line is that the speech was a true threat and was 
thus unprotected speech under the holding of Watts v. United States.23 
The second line is that the speech caused a substantial disruption at 
school, and therefore the school was reasonable in taking action to 
discipline the student under the test set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community. School District.24 
While the Supreme Court has often stated that schools have a 
tremendous amount of freedom in regulating student activity while on 
campus, the Supreme Court has protected student expression in most 
cases. However, each of those cases has created certain exceptions, 
which allow a school to restrict a student’s speech. Although student 
speech that rises to the level of a true threat is not protected under the 
First Amendment, the constitutional rights of students to free speech 
and due process are involved in any disciplinary action, and 
accordingly this section discusses what the Supreme Court has held on 
those rights.25 
                                                                                                                                         
students and legislation and policy being developed to address and protect educator’s 
concerns about such activity). 
22 Cassel, supra note 5, at 650–51; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
23 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
24 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
25 Id. at 581; A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 548 F. Supp. 2d 219, 
223 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
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A. Supreme Court Holdings on Student Free Speech 
One of the cornerstones of life in the United States is embodied in 
the Constitution’s First Amendment declaration that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . .”26 However, the 
necessity of schools to have control of large numbers of students often 
leads to controversy regarding how the school proceeds in disciplining 
a student for his or her speech. On some occasions, school disciplinary 
action has raised questions about whether out-of-school speech, if it 
has an impact on school safety, was lawfully disciplined. This section 
will discuss the Supreme Court guidelines on when a school can 
lawfully take disciplinary action that implicates a student’s First 
Amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of student free speech 
specifically in four seminal cases; however, none of these addressed 
the aspect of protecting student safety through the regulation of 
another’s speech, nor have they addressed regulation of online speech. 
Despite that fact, the cases lay a foundation from which an assessment 
can be made as to whether a disciplinary action violates a student’s 
First Amendment rights. 
The most important of the Supreme Court cases on free speech, 
and most relevant for this note, was the first case dealing with student 
speech heard in the Supreme Court, Tinker v. Des Moines Independant 
Community School District.27 In this 1969 case, the Court held that the 
right to free speech extended to students in school.28 In Tinker, 
students sued over being suspended for wearing black armbands—
symbols of their opposition to U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. 
The Court’s decision in Tinker is far removed from the computer age, 
but its statement that “it can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate” is still relevant today for online 
student speech.29 
Despite its clear support for First Amendment rights, Tinker did 
place two important limits on those rights for students. The court 
stated that even though the guarantee of free speech to a student 
extended into school, a school can discipline a student for speech that 
“‘materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of 
                                                          
26
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 506. 
216 UMass Law Review v. 7 | 208 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’” 30 or “impinge[s] 
upon the rights of other students,”31—in short, anything that 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others.”32 It is important to note that the court 
held that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not 
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”33 The court 
did not find that the students’ symbolic speech would have interfered 
with the discipline or operation of the school, nor that it infringed on 
the rights of other students, and therefore found the school’s action 
violated the students’ right to free speech.34 
The test set forth by the Supreme Court is now commonly referred 
to as the “Tinker test,” and it is often applied by lower courts to cases 
involving student speech both on and off campus—and is one of the 
lines of reasoning followed by lower courts in cases involving 
threatening student speech. Therefore, it follows that if a student’s 
speech on a social networking site raises a legitimate concern for the 
safety of the school, a student, or a teacher, and thereby materially 
disrupts the operation of the school, then the school should be able to 
take disciplinary action to prevent any danger, even if that action that 
would otherwise violate a student’s free speech rights. This should be 
true even if the speech originated outside of school, as long as it had a 
substantial effect at school. 
After Tinker, subsequent Supreme Court decisions found that 
certain other forms of school discipline did not infringe the student’s 
rights to free speech, but none of these cases provide clear guidance on 
how to deal with threatening speech outside of school. In Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court recognized that “the 
constitutional rights of students in the public schools ‘are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.’”35 
The Court held that “the First Amendment does not prevent the school 
officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech 
such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.”36 In a second case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 
the Supreme Court determined that a school could restrict student 
                                                          
30 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
31 Id. at 509. 
32 Id. at 513. 
33 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
34 Id. at 514. 
35 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (quoting New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985)). 
36 Id. at 685. 
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speech in a school’s newspaper because the school would essentially 
be sponsoring the speech if it were allowed.37 The Court created 
another exception in its most recent decision on student speech, Morse 
v. Frederick, more commonly called the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case. In 
this case, the Court held that a school could punish a student for out of 
school activity, at a school-approved event, but this holding was 
narrowly tailored to focus on the school’s interest in restricting speech 
that promotes illegal drug use.38 One commentator, and undoubtedly 
many others would agree, criticized this holding as a missed 
opportunity to clearly state whether a school could discipline off-
campus speech,39 and the failure to state this ability has caused 
difficulty in lower courts trying to deal with off-campus internet 
speech. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Holdings and Internet Speech 
None of the cases heard by the Supreme Court on student speech 
spoke to expressions on the internet nor to student speech that would 
have an impact on student safety; however, these cases provide a 
foundation for approaching such speech by showing that exceptions 
have been found to Tinker. In summary, these four cases show that the 
test in Tinker is not the only test for analyzing a school’s discipline of 
student speech, and that a student’s constitutional rights, although 
protected in school, must be viewed “in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”40 Speech can be restricted 
by the school at out-of-school, school-sponsored events without 
offending the First Amendment rights of the student if it: (1) has a 
material and substantial effect on the rights of the school or of other 
students; (2) is vulgar or lewd, inappropriate speech; (3) is the content 
of a newspaper or other school-sponsored speech and the school deems 
it inappropriate; or (4) is speech that promotes illegal drug use.41 If the 
trend of finding exceptions to Tinker continues, it is likely that the 
Court in the future may find another exception for schools that 
discipline a student for online speech that threatens school or student 
safety. 
                                                          
37 Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
38 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007). 
39 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: Article: 
Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2008). 
40 Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; citing Fraser, 478 U.S at 682). 
41 Diane Heckman, J.D., Just Kidding: K-12 Students, Threats and First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech Protection, 259 EDUC. LAW REP. 381, 383 (2010). 
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Building on the Tinker analysis appears to be the most common 
method in both Supreme Court and lower court cases where student 
speech is an issue. However, if the speech is threatening in nature, the 
Court’s decision in Watts v. United States would provide an alternative 
line of reasoning under which schools could take action on student 
speech, even if it is online, on a social network. 
IV. THREATENING SPEECH ON SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Although schools should continue to be concerned about protecting 
students’ right to free speech, in the aftermath of terrible school 
massacres like those at Columbine High School in 1999, Red Lake 
Senior High School in 2005, and Virginia Tech in 2007, concerns over 
student safety have increased, and as a result, schools should have an 
increased ability to take action on threatening speech to protect 
students. While these events are relatively rare, they are still tragic 
because they involve students. Even more unfortunate is finding out 
after, that events leading up to the incident indicated something was 
wrong with the eventual attacker, and students could have been saved 
if schools were able to act more freely on reports of threatening speech 
arising from sources like social networking sites and cyber-bullying. 
The following section discusses the “true threat” doctrine and its 
application to the school setting and to social networking, and 
proposes certain actions that schools should be able to take in response 
to such threats. 
A. Unprotected Speech and Watts’ “True Threat” Doctrine 
While the First Amendment of the Constitution protects a wide 
range of speech, there are some categorical exceptions. These include: 
“(1) insurrectionary speech, (2) immediate danger speech, (3) fighting 
words, (4) threatening speech, (5) defamatory speech, and (6) obscene 
speech.”42 Schools, therefore, have the legal authority to discipline 
these types of speech between students in school. The question for our 
purposes is whether and how that authority extends to threatening 
speech that occurs online by or between students on a social network.43 
                                                          
42 Id. at 382. 
43 See Samantha Neiman & Jill DeVoe, Crime, Violence, Discipline, and Safety 
in U.S. Public Schools: Findings From the School Survey on Crime and Safety: 
2007–08 (NCES 2009-326), NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 2009) (showing that 39,600 schools reported 461,910 
incidents of threats of a physical attack without a weapon, meaning in nearly 9.7 
threats per student at the reporting schools). 
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The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on a school’s discipline 
of a student for threatening speech made against another, but the Court 
created a “true threat” doctrine in Watts v. United States, holding that 
speech that constitutes a “true threat” to an individual is not protected 
by the First Amendment.44 In this case, the eighteen-year-old Robert 
Watts attended a rally in Washington D.C. in 1966 against the U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam.45 Once the rally broke into smaller discussion 
groups, Watts voiced that he had been drafted and intended not to go, 
and he said that if they gave him a rifle “the first man I want to get in 
my sights is L.B.J.”46 It is unclear from the facts how or why Watts 
was arrested for this statement, but his apparent threat against the 
sitting President, Lyndon B. Johnson, was held by the trial and 
appellate court to be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a), which makes 
threatening the life of or threatening bodily harm on the President a 
felony.47 
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that Watts had not 
made a true threat, and pointed out that Watts made this statement in a 
context where it was mere political hyperbole.48 However, the decision 
made it clear that the form and context of the speech together, as well 
as the resulting reaction of those who heard the speech, are important 
factors in determining if there is a true threat.49 The court also pointed 
out that there was a conditional nature to the threat, which was that 
Watts had to go to his draft physical, which he declared he would not 
do, and had to be given a rifle before the threat could even be carried 
out.50 In sum, the true threat doctrine requires the court to look at “the 
reaction of the listener, the conditional nature of the threat, the extent 
to which one’s speech is mere political hyperbole, and the overall 
context and background circumstances of the expression.”51 
                                                          
44 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969). 
45 Id. at 706. 
46 Id. at 706. 
47 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2011) (Reads in part: “Whoever knowingly and 
willfully. . .[makes] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the 
President of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both.”). 
48 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705. 
49 Id. at 706. 
50 Id. 
51 Richard V. Blystone, School Speech v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of 
Violence on School Campuses Throughout This Nation, How Should School Officials 
Respond to Threatening Student Expression?, 2007 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 199, 205 
(2007). See also Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08. 
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B. Applying Watts to Student Speech 
Applying the Watts factors to student speech is more complex in 
some ways, and easier in others, than applying it to facts like in the 
principal case of Watts. The application of Watts, to threatening 
student speech both online and in school could be complicated by the 
fact that the students are children and young adults, and may not fully 
grasp the meaning of threatening words they are saying. However, 
assessment of the threat as a school administrator might be made 
easier by the fact that he or she would likely have more information 
about a student and the community before acting on a threat, and 
would not be acting on the threat alone.52 Richard Blystone, in an 
article about school safety and speech, laid out some of these 
additional factors: 
Factors that school officials might consider before acting on a 
perceived threat include the age and maturity of the student 
speaker, his or her past academic record, whether the expression 
was directly communicated to the object of the threat or some third 
person, whether the speaker intended to carry out his or her threat, 
other instances of school violence in the community, and whether 
the recipient’s response to the expression was reasonable.53 
These additional factors may add some complexity to the decision of 
whether a threat is true threat by requiring more to consider when 
deciding whether to take action, but it would also give the decision to 
act a stronger backing if the action taken by an administrator would 
implicate a student’s free speech rights. 
Even with the additional factors that schools and courts should 
look at when dealing with a student threat; courts have been successful 
in applying the Watts factors to in-school speech on a number of 
occasions.54 In one such case, Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 
Sarah Lovell, a fifteen-year-old high school student at California’s Mt. 
Carmel High School, allegedly threatened to shoot her guidance 
counselor if the latter did not change her class schedule.55 This threat 
came after a frustrating day for Lovell of being sent between offices 
trying to get her schedule straight, and when the counselor said she 
may not be able to make the final changes because the classes were 
                                                          
52 Blystone, supra note 51, at 205. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Cassel, 
supra note 5, at 657–59. 
55 Lovell, 90 F.3d at 368–69. 
2012 Social Networking and Student Safety 221 
overloaded. Lovell apparently said, “I’m so angry, I could just shoot 
someone.”56 Lovell apologized for her actions, but the counselor 
claimed to have felt threatened and believed Lovell was serious in her 
threat, and she reported her to the assistant principal who eventually 
gave Lovell a three-day suspension.57 
The trial court held that the school district had violated Lovell’s 
free speech rights because her speech did not rise to the requisite level 
for disciplinary action.58 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
District Court’s ruling made the California Educational Code 
inappropriately trump federal law.59 After briefly discussing the 
Supreme Court student speech cases, the court held that they did not 
matter in the analysis because “threats of physical violence are not 
protected by the First Amendment under either federal or state law, 
and as a result, it does not matter to our analysis that Sarah Lovell 
uttered her comments while at school.”60 The court then analyzed 
Lovell’s statement using Watts, taking into consideration the 
reasonableness of the school’s action in the circumstances.61 This 
determination was based on whether the person who had heard the 
statement would interpret it as “a serious expression of intent to harm 
or assault” in light of the entire factual context,62 and noted “in light of 
the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in 
taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other 
students.”63 
The Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision, and held 
that the school district did not violate Lovell’s First Amendment rights 
based on the effect that the threatening statement had on the school 
counselor, and that the counselor’s reaction and the school’s 
disciplinary action were reasonable responses under the circumstances 
because of the prevalence of violence in schools.64 Notably, the court 
held that if Lovell had been able to prove that she did not utter the 
statement as a direct threat as the counselor understood it, that the 
school’s action would have violated her free speech rights.65 
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C. Cases Involving Threatening Student Speech Online 
The following cases exhibit how lower courts nationwide have 
dealt with arguably threatening online speech by students. The 
discussions and holdings contained in these cases illustrate that student 
speech need not rise to the level of Watts’ true threat doctrine for a 
school to act upon it. Additionally, these cases show the interplay of 
the Tinker and Watts analyses and how either or both could be used by 
courts and schools to address threatening student speech. 
1. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. 
The first appellate decision in a case on threatening internet speech 
is J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in 2002.66 In this case, J.S. was an eighth grade student 
at Nitschmann Middle School who created a web site called “Teacher 
Sux” that “made derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening 
comments, primarily about the student’s algebra teacher, Mrs. 
Kathleen Fulmer and Nitschmann Middle School principal, Mr. A. 
Thomas Kartsotis. The comments took the form of written words, 
pictures, animation, and sound clips.”67 Additionally, the site had some 
derogatory comments about a German teacher, but these were 
apparently not a basis for J.S.’s discipline.68 A disclaimer greeted 
visitors to the site, but there was no limitation on access, so anyone 
could visit the site.69 
The most disturbing aspect of this site, and the characteristic that 
set it apart from other cases where student speech had been protected, 
was a section about Mrs. Fulmer titled “Why Should She Die?” and 
asking for money to help hire a hit man to kill the teacher.70 Many 
students and faculty members viewed the site and felt the threat was 
serious, and Mrs. Fulmer testified as being frightened, actually 
suffered adverse effects on her health from the stress, and was unable 
to continue working at the school.71 Additionally, the court noted that 
the site had a “demoralizing impact on the school community” that 
included low morale among students and staff.72 The school did not 
take any disciplinary action until the summer before the following 
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school year, giving J.S. a ten-day suspension.73 The decision by the 
school was upheld through the trial and appeal levels, all the way to 
the state supreme court.74 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the Watts test as to 
whether J.S.’s statements were a true threat, and found that they did 
not rise to the level of a true threat despite the harm suffered by Mrs. 
Fulmer, because the school did not treat them as such; it had allowed 
J.S. to continue attending classes and activities.75 The court’s holding 
seems to imply that had the school acted immediately, they would 
have been more open to the argument that the speech was a true threat. 
The court then decided that because J.S. facilitated on-campus 
dissemination of the website and aimed it at a particular audience, 
namely his fellow students, there was “a sufficient nexus between the 
web site and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-
campus.”76 Moving through the different Supreme Court tests as well 
as those advocated in lower courts, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
applied both Fraser and Tinker, and held that J.S.’s website caused 
enough actual and substantial disruption that went beyond a “mild 
distraction or curiosity” to satisfy the requirements of Tinker, and 
therefore, the school’s discipline was upheld.77 While this case did not 
involve a social networking site, the court’s application of Tinker to 
online threatening student speech is significant because it illustrates 
that there is a standard that both schools and courts can use to evaluate 
a threat and resulting disciplinary action on a social network even if it 
is not a true threat. 
2. Wisniewski v. Board of Education 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Center 
School District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
heard the case of Aaron Wisniewski, who had an instant messenger 
icon depicting the firing of a pistol at a person’s head.78 The words 
underneath the icon called for the killing of his English teacher, with 
whom one of Wisniewski’s friends shared the icon.79 It was 
determined that Wisniewski intended the icon as a joke; nevertheless, 
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after a hearing, the icon was found to have caused enough of a 
disruption to warrant discipline by the school and Wisniewski was 
given a one semester suspension.80 On appeal of the suspension, the 
court considered applying Watts, but found that “we think that school 
officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student 
speech than the Watts standard allows.”81 
Instead, the Second Circuit found that the icon crossed the 
boundary of being a mere expression, as protected in Tinker, and that it 
was reasonable to assume that the icon would have come to the 
school’s attention and create a disturbance at school.82 While it is 
obvious that this icon did come to the attention of the school (because 
there would have been no case otherwise), the issue is that although 
Wisniewski made the icon off-campus, there was a foreseeable chance 
that the icon would have an effect at school and thereby, lead to a 
potentially substantial disruption. The court upheld the school’s action 
and determined that Wisniewski’s icon was not constitutionally 
protected speech under Tinker.83 The extension of the Tinker test to the 
threatening expression in this case is a positive sign that such an 
analysis might be acceptable to the Supreme Court, especially as 
certiorari was denied by the high court.84 
3. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn. 
One of the most recent cases involving student speech, threats, and 
social networking is Tatro v. University of Minnesota, in which 
University officials found that a mortuary science student, Amanda 
Tatro, violated school policy by posting threatening speech in her 
Facebook status messages that were viewable by possibly hundreds of 
people. 85 While the focus of this note is how primary and secondary 
schools can deal with threatening speech on social networks, the 
court’s analysis in Tatro illustrates a willingness to be liberal with the 
interpretation of what speech is threatening, and of school policies to 
deal with such activity. Therefore, a discussion of this case is helpful 
in crafting a model policy that could be adopted by lawmakers and 
schools to deal with threatening student speech. 
Tatro’s status messages were arguably threatening, but were, 
according to her, in reference to her school activities. For example, one 
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of her messages included statements like “Amanda Beth Tatro Is 
looking forward to Monday’s embalming therapy as well as a rumored 
opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to be taken 
out with a trocar.”86 While this statement is clearly about schoolwork, 
a trocar is a sharp instrument and the statement that she had “lots of 
aggression to be taken out,” could pose a threat to other students in the 
classroom, especially read out of context, like on an online social 
network. Another status message read in part, “I still want to stab a 
certain someone in the throat with a trocar though. Hmm . . .perhaps I 
will spend the evening updating my ‘Death List #5’ and making 
friends with the crematory guy.”87 Tatro admitted this statement was in 
reference to an ex-boyfriend and that she knew he would see it and 
interpret it as referring to him since the context of the statement did 
not make its target clear.88 
After seeing a number of these posts, a fellow mortuary student 
reported Tatro’s messages to the department faculty, which resulted in 
the faculty asking Tatro to stay home for a few days.89 Tatro was 
subsequently cleared and returned to school, but the University filed a 
formal complaint against Tatro for violating school policy, which she 
had agreed to follow, to not participate in “threatening, harassing, or 
assaultive conduct.”90 The campus committee on student behavior 
(CCSB) found that Tatro violated school policy and imposed 
sanctions, placing her on academic probation for the remainder of her 
undergraduate career, giving her a failing grade in the course, and 
requiring her to enroll in an ethics course, write a letter to the 
department about the subject, and have a psychiatric evaluation.91 The 
findings of the CCSB were appealed to the provost of the university, 
who affirmed the sanctions.92 
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota heard the appeal of the 
provost’s decision, and found that Tatro’s posts constituted threatening 
conduct, and therefore posed a threat to student safety upon which the 
school could take disciplinary action.93 Furthermore, the Court stated 
that even if Tatro’s friends understood the context of her posts, it did 
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not change that they could be viewed as reasonably threatening by 
others nor “diminish the university’s substantial interest in protecting 
the safety of its students and faculty and addressing potentially 
threatening conduct.”94 The Court found the school’s action reasonable 
based on the threatening nature of the speech stating, “the realities of 
our time require that our schools and universities be vigilant in 
watching for and responding to student behavior that indicates a 
potential for violence.”95 
The court discusses the true threat doctrine but does not apply it 
despite its conclusion that the conduct was threatening in nature; 
instead, it applies Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.96 
Interestingly, the court notes that a substantial disruption could look 
different at different school levels, e.g., between primary schools and 
universities, but nonetheless it finds that Tinker can be applied 
broadly, and that Tatro’s speech caused a substantial disruption at 
school that permitted academic discipline without violating her right to 
free speech.97 
This case illustrates the impact of having something in a school’s 
conduct code, regulations, or policies, which, at least following the 
Court’s reasoning in this case, could free the court to broadly apply the 
Tinker test to threatening speech that violated the school’s conduct 
code. Language in a school’s code permitting discipline of off-campus 
speech raises issues about whether that type of regulation is too vague 
or overreaching, and in two recently decided cases, the respective 
courts found that schools could not regulate student speech outside of 
school even though the school code, at least on its face, permitted such 
regulation.98 While Watts would be applicable to this speech if the 
court determined it was a true threat, Tatro illustrates that the student’s 
speech would not have to rise to that level to be disciplined by the 
school because a violation of a school rule would constitute a 
substantial disruption to satisfy Tinker, even more so if it involved 
threatening or dangerous conduct. 
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4. D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. #60 
In the most recent case involving threatening online student 
speech, D.J.M. v. Hannibal School District #60, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit found that a student’s instant messages were true 
threats and that the school was reasonable in its punishment of the 
student.99 The Court’s discussion and analysis of the speech in this 
case is illustrative of recent court decisions regarding threatening 
student speech, as it utilizes both the Watts true threat and Tinker tests 
in coming to its decision. In this case, D.J.M., a tenth grade student at 
Hannibal High School in Missouri, was sending instant messages to a 
fellow student stating that he had access to a gun and naming specific 
students he would shoot, as well as groups of students such as 
“‘midgets,’ ‘fags,’ and ‘negro bitches.’”100 Additionally, D.J.M. had 
threatened to shoot himself after killing the others and said that he 
wanted “[H]annibal to be known for something.”101 
The student with whom D.J.M. had been communicating, C.M., 
became concerned about these statements because she knew he had 
been hospitalized and was on medication for depression.102 C.M. 
forwarded D.J.M.’s comments to both an adult friend and the principal 
of Hannibal High School, who then forwarded the statements to the 
district superintendent Jill Janes.103 Powell and Janes decided to call 
the police, and on the night of October 24, 2006, D.J.M. was arrested 
and sent to juvenile detention.104 D.J.M. was next sent to a hospital for 
psychiatric evaluation where he remained until November 28 before 
being sent back to juvenile detention. While in the hospital he admitted 
that he had contemplated suicide.105 One week after the initial arrest, 
Powell suspended D.J.M. for ten days, then for the rest of the school 
year, for having a disruptive impact on the school and for the conduct 
resulting in his arrest and detention, which violated the school’s code 
of conduct prohibiting disruptive and threatening speech.106 
In determining whether D.J.M. had the requisite intent to carry out 
the threat under Watts, the court points to Doe v. Pulaski County. 
Special School District, which defined a true threat as a “statement that 
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a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression 
of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.”107 Whether the 
recipient of the threat was the target of the threatened action was not of 
consequence to the court, as it stated that intent to carry out the threat 
was satisfied, if the threat was communicated to either the target or a 
third party.108 The Court found that D.J.M. had the requisite intent 
because he intentionally communicated the threats to a third party, 
namely C.M., and should have “reasonably foreseen that his 
statements would have been communicated to his alleged victims.”109 
The Court also found that D.J.M.’s statements would have been 
threatening to a reasonable person based on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding his statements.110 These circumstances 
included D.J.M.’s admitted depression, rejection by a love interest, 
access to a weapon and expressed intention to take it to school, his 
statement that he “wanted Hannibal to be known for something,” and 
C.M.’s concerns based on D.J.M.’s statements.111 The Court points out 
that the reaction of the readers of his statements show that they were 
taken seriously as threats and it was reasonable for the school to treat 
them as such saying: 
In light of the District’s obligation to ensure the safety of its 
students and reasonable concerns created by shooting deaths at 
other schools such as Columbine and the Red Lake Reservation 
school, the district court did not err in concluding that the District 
did not violate the First Amendment by notifying the police about 
D.J.M.’s threatening instant messages and subsequently 
suspending him after he was placed in juvenile detention.112 
The District argued in the alternative that even if D.J.M.’s comments 
were not viewed as a true threat, its actions were reasonable and did 
not violate the First Amendment because his speech caused a 
substantial disruption at school and therefore satisfied the Tinker 
test.113 Word of D.J.M.’s statements led to concerned parents calling 
the school concerned about what the school was doing and whether 
their student was on D.J.M.’s “hit list.”114 The school spent 
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“considerable time dealing with these concerns,”115 as well as time and 
effort to ensure safety by increasing security by assigning staff to 
monitor entrances and public areas and limiting access to the school.116 
The Court concluded that following either line of reasoning, D.J.M.’s 
suspension from school was reasonable under the circumstances as 
“one of the primary missions of schools is to encourage student 
creativity and to develop student ability to express ideas, but neither 
can flourish if violence threatens the school environment.”117 
This case is the latest and most instructive case on how schools 
could deal with threatening student speech originating on a social 
network. Since Watts and Tinker are the only relevant precedent 
addressing threatening speech and First Amendment rights of students, 
the Eighth Circuit approach is a sound approach for schools to deal 
with this type of student speech. If school procedure and policy work 
these analyses in to their approach of disciplining threatening student 
speech and the resulting discipline is reasonable, courts would be hard-
pressed to find a constitutional violation by the school. 
D. Social Networking and the “True Threat” Doctrine 
If a student’s speech falls under the true threat doctrine of Watts, 
then the student’s First Amendment right to free speech does not come 
into play and schools can act quickly and decisively to prevent any 
danger at school. However, recent cases involving threatening student 
speech online or on social networking sites, illustrate that the Watts 
analysis is not always appropriate or necessary even when the speech 
is threatening, and that threats between students do not have to reach 
the level of a true threat for a school to act on them. These cases also 
show that courts can apply the Tinker test in situations involving 
student speech on social networks, especially with added elements 
from cases like Lovell and Watts. Whichever line of reasoning the 
court chooses, it is clear with the most recent cases that courts can 
handle online student speech cases following Watts, Tinker, or even 
both. Despite the ability of the courts to handle these situations, the 
schools, which are asked on a daily basis to look after the best interest 
and safety of its students, lack clear guidance on how to discipline a 
student when off-campus threatening speech on a social networking 
site is brought to a school official’s attention. In the next part of this 
note I will lay out a model procedure to deal with threatening online 
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student speech, bringing together elements of the case law discussed in 
this note. 
V. MODEL PROCEDURE FOR SCHOOLS TO DISCIPLINE STUDENT 
INTERNET SPEECH 
The one thing that is clear from court precedent is that schools can 
and have been able to act on threatening student speech that appears on 
a social networking site, and that actions taken by schools to prevent 
danger have been upheld by most courts as constitutional. The courts 
in these cases have followed either the Watts true threat analysis or the 
Tinker substantial disruption test, and usually the courts discuss both, 
applying one or the other to the facts of the case. Despite the recent 
trend of courts upholding the discipline under one of those tests, such 
as in Tatro and D.J.M., it is inevitable that more problems will arise in 
situations involving threatening student speech if schools remain 
without a model procedure to discipline this speech and have to wait to 
see if the discipline is upheld in court. This is especially true as the 
means and methods for internet speech are constantly changing with 
the advent of new technology like smart phones and other mobile 
internet devices where “expression travels at lightning speed from 
student’s homes to the schoolhouse.”118 The increased involvement of 
students in social media has accordingly increased the ways students 
can talk to each other and express their ideas both in and outside of 
schools. 
There are a limited number of courts that have heard a case on 
student speech, internet based or not, and have recognized that schools 
present unique circumstances where regulation of student speech is 
necessary to maintain order and discipline in school.119 Therefore, in 
creating a policy to deal with threatening student speech, it must be 
remembered that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”120 However, 
when a student’s speech or expression on a social network takes on a 
threatening nature, school’s should have a policy in place with a 
procedure to handle these situations that balances the concerns of the 
school with the rights of the student, while allowing the school to act 
quickly and decisively. However, courts should be careful in providing 
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too much discretion to schools; school officials should only be able to 
discipline students for threatening speech on a social network that 
poses a danger of violence of school, or that is of such a nature that it 
has a substantial effect at school and disrupts normal school activity. 
Keeping those basic principles in mind, off-campus student speech 
on a social network should be normally afforded the same First 
Amendment protection as any other off-line speech.121 However, when 
a student comment on a social network’s message board or wall 
threatens violent action at school or directed towards a faculty member 
or fellow student, and these comments come to the school’s attention, 
then the school should be able to act to prevent any possible violence. 
Even general, nonspecific threats have an impact on the school 
community at large because the possibility exists that violence could 
erupt at any time at school, and school officials have an obligation to 
prevent any danger to their students. 
When the student’s speech first comes to the attention of a school 
official, they must determine if the threat involves an action at school, 
or against a student or official at the school. Because the threat is 
online, the context surrounding the threat may not be readily apparent, 
so even a vague threat should be evaluated seriously by the school. In 
order to provide proper due process to the student who expressed the 
threat, the next step should be removal of the student from the 
classroom followed by questioning from the principal or other school 
official about the threatening speech. During questioning, the student 
would be confronted with the speech and accusations against him, and 
the school officials should take into consideration the student’s age, 
maturity, academic record, and whether other violent incidents might 
have influenced the student. Furthermore, the school should consider if 
the student who made the threat, previously had discipline problems at 
school, or made a threat before at school. 
If the school officials determine the speech involved, rises to the 
level of a true threat, even if this determination occurs before 
questioning the student, then under the true threat doctrine from Watts, 
the student’s speech is not protected under the First Amendment. As a 
result, the school would be able to take any reasonable action to 
prevent danger from occurring at school, which would likely involve 
the police and at least a suspension from school. What further criminal 
punishment could occur is beyond the scope of this note, but based on 
what occurs in a criminal proceeding, the school could impose an 
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appropriate punishment on the student whether it is a lengthy 
suspension, loss of credits or grades, or expulsion. 
The school’s ability to discipline the student for his or her online 
threatening speech is not limited to speech that rises to the level of a 
true threat however. Recent case law illustrates that the Tinker test of 
substantial disruption is applicable to these situations, and allows the 
school to take disciplinary action without a violation of the student’s 
First Amendment rights. Even if the speech would only create a 
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption at the school, then school 
officials can still act on the speech in order to intervene before any 
possible danger or disruption occurs at the school.122 It would be 
reasonable for officials to act in this type of situation because with the 
prevalence of social media in the lives of students, even a vague hint 
that a student may do something endangering student safety at school 
could spread quickly around the school creating a disruption even if 
the threat was not actually going to be carried out. 
A final method would be beyond the ability of the school to create, 
but the Supreme Court’s holding in Morse suggests that an extension 
of Morse to deal with off-campus threatening student speech would be 
possible. The Fifth Circuit has actually already done something similar 
in the case of Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Independent School 
District, where a student created and maintained a diary about making 
a neo-Nazi group and attacking the school.123 After the diary came to 
the attention of school officials, the student was suspended. He then 
sued for a violation of his First Amendment rights.124 The Fifth Circuit 
held that the school did not violate his rights, and extended Morse, 
creating an exemption prohibiting speech advocating drug use, to 
apply to language advocating violence.125 The creation of a categorical 
exception to the First Amendment rights of students for speech that 
advocates “harm that is demonstrably grave and that derives that 
gravity from the ‘special danger’ to the physical safety of students 
arising from school environment,”126 would provide schools with an 
even broader ability to take action on threatening speech that appears 
on a social network or elsewhere. 
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One advantage of this method would be that it would not 
necessarily rely on the speech creating a disruption at the school as 
Tinker focuses on, or for the speech to be a true threat and falling 
under Watts, even if both lines of reasoning would be applicable. This 
type of exemption could provide some clarity, because if the speech 
was threatening the school could unquestionably act on it without 
violating a student’s right to free speech. However, creating an 
exemption like this might also raise concerns over giving a school too 
much discretion in punishing a student because it would be up to the 
school to determine the definition of a grave harm. Therefore, in order 
for a school to be able to discipline a student via this categorical 
exception, the courts would have to define grave harm in a way that 
would balance student rights with protecting campus safety, while still 
allowing schools leeway to act on any threatening speech that does not 
rise to the level of a true threat. 
Finally, the procedure would have to provide for appropriate 
discipline of the offending student, which would have to be reasonable 
and proportionate for the circumstances. First of all, the school should 
remove the student from classes to prevent any immediate danger and 
to find out the student’s story and intent. Following the removal, 
school officials can better assess the situation using the factors 
discussed above and determine whether the student’s activity warrants 
a detention, suspension, or expulsion. The length or type of suspension 
could vary in length, but should be only as long as necessary to 
prevent the student from carrying out the threat. As a result, the 
discipline could range from an “in-school detention” to a year-long or 
longer expulsion, depending on the school’s policies for such 
discipline, the severity of the threat, and the amount of disruption that 
threat caused at school. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Parents, teachers, and administrators should encourage free 
expression by students inside and outside of schools in all forms of 
media; however, when it comes to school safety, school officials are in 
a unique position which requires them to take measures to protect 
hundreds or thousands of students. When a student’s expression takes 
on a potentially threatening nature that places other students, faculty, 
or the school itself in danger, officials must be able to make a quick 
decision to prevent any harm, even if that requires action that would 
traditionally be considered to violate the student’s First Amendment 
rights. 
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In a time where the internet is a part of everyday life for children 
and adults alike, it is necessary for schools to have a means to take 
action when a student posts threatening language online that would 
affect the school. However, the issue of how to discipline a student’s 
threatening speech on a social network has not been addressed by any 
legislature or the U. S. Supreme Court. The present practice in the 
majority of courts is to protect student speech made on an online social 
network under the First Amendment, since it originated off campus, 
and indeed, this speech should remain protected unless the speech 
embodies a threat or substantial disruption to the school. However, this 
practice is changing with the increasing use of technology by students 
at home and in school. 
As illustrated by the cases discussed in this note, the recent trend in 
lower courts is to uphold the school’s actions in disciplining students 
for threats that appeared online. Despite this trend, there is no 
widespread legislation or Supreme Court holding that would protect 
schools’ actions from being subjected to First Amendment challenges. 
If schools and courts adopted procedures similar to the model 
procedure laid out in this note, school officials would have an 
approach that would allow them to take quick, decisive action to 
preserve order, discipline, and safety within the school without having 
to worry if their actions would withstand a First Amendment challenge 
in court. If the trend that has developed in the lower court continues, it 
is only a matter of time before a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and schools will have an established standard to follow when dealing 
with threatening online student speech. 
